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IV 
Respondent, County Board of Equalization of Salt Lake County (County) respectfully 
submits the following brief in response to the brief of the Petitioner, Action TV (Action). 
JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the petition for judicial review filed by 
Action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-14 and 16(1) (1997) and § 78-2-2(3)(e)(ii) 
(1996). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AND STATUTES 
Article XIII, section 2, part (1), Utah Const. 
All tangible property in the state, not exempt under the laws of 
the United States, or under this Constitution, shall be taxed at a 
uniform and equal rate in proportion to its value, to be 
ascertained as provided by law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102 (1996 & Supp. 1998) 
(8)(a) "Escaped property" means any property, whether 
personal, land, or any improvements to the property, subject to 
taxation and is: 
(i) inadvertently omitted from the tax rolls, 
assigned to the incorrect parcel, or assessed to the 
wrong taxpayer by the assessing authority; 
(ii) undervalued or omitted from the tax rolls 
because of the failure of the taxpayer to comply 
with the reporting requirements of this chapter; or 
(iii) undervalued because of errors made by the 
assessing authority based upon incomplete or 
erroneous information furnished by the taxpayer. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-103(1) (1996): 
All tangible taxable property shall be assessed and taxed at a 
uniform and equal rate on the basis of its fair market value, as 
valued on January 1, unless otherwise provided by law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-306 (1996) 
(1) The county assessor may request a signed statement in 
affidavit form from any person setting forth all the real and 
personal property assessable by the assessor which is owned, 
possessed, managed, or under the control of the person at 12 
o'clock noon on January 1. This statement shall be filed within 
30 days after requested by the assessor. 
(2) The affidavit shall include the following: 
(a) all property belonging to, claimed by, or in 
the possession, control, or management of the 
person, any firm of which the person is a member, 
or any corporation of which the person is 
president, secretary, cashier, or managing agent; 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-309(1) (1996) 
Any escaped property may be assessed by the original assessing 
authority at any time as far back as five years prior to the time 
of discovery, in which case the assessor shall enter the 
assessments on the tax rolls and follow the procedures 
established under Part 13 of this chapter. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or before March 16,1994, the County Assessor' s office audited the records 
of Action's three business locations. The audit revealed that Action did not report on its 
personal property affidavits any of the property which was subject to rental contracts ("rent-
to-own") from any of its stores for any of the years at issue. R. at 935-7, 940; Exhibits R-1, 
2,3. 
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2. This rental property consisted primarily of electronic equipment, furniture and 
appliances. R. at 6. 
3. An audit was completed for each store for each year subject to the escaped 
assessment. The audit identifies property by type, such as rental equipment, and a 
corresponding code number. The code for rental equipment is 260. R. at 935; Exhibits R-l, 
2,3. 
4. The total property tax due as a result of the audit of each store and year subject 
to the escaped property assessment is $17,437.39, which represents an omission of taxable 
value totaling $978,834. R. at 250; Exhibits R-l, 2, 3. 
5. The County Assessor multiplied Action's actual cost for the property by the 
Tax Commission's (Commission) percent good schedule for five year class life (Class 3) to 
determine the fair market value of the property. R. at 184-5, 190; Exhibits R-l, 2, 3 and 5. 
6. The five year class life represents the useful economic life of the property, and 
is based on the Internal Revenue Services' (IRS) class life schedules. Transcript at 153-4, 
Addendum A; Exhibits R-5. 
7. The Class 3 five year class life also accounts for the greater wear and tear 
recognized for small rental equipment. R. at 871-2; Exhibit R-5. 
8. Only property subject to rent-to-own contracts was taxed; property held for sale 
was exempted as inventory. R. at 938-9. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The evidence is undisputed that Action did not report its rental property, which was 
subject to rent-to-own contracts on January 1, for the years in question. As a result nearly 
a million dollars of taxable value escaped assessment. When the Assessor's office conducted 
an audit of Action's business records, it discovered the omission and imposed an escaped 
property assessment. 
The County valued the omitted property by multiplying Action's actual cost for the 
property by the percent good factor found in the Commission's Recommended Schedules for 
Personal Property Valuation. The Assessor used Class 3 (five year valuation schedule), 
which specifically recognizes "small rental equipment" as an example of the type of property 
considered subject to the five year class life, due in part to the severe wear and tear to which 
rental equipment is potentially subject. 
Action's contention that the Commission's findings of fact on the issues of escaped 
property and the proper percentage of depreciation which should apply, are inadequate and 
not based on substantial evidence, is incorrect. The Commission made adequate findings of 
fact to permit meaningful appellate review and the evidence is substantial to support the 
Commission's findings of fact. Therefore, the Commission's decision should be affirmed. 
Action did not submit an appraisal and therefore it has failed to meet its burden to overturn 
the Board's value. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COMMISSION CORRECTLY DETERMINED 
THAT ACTION'S RENTAL PROPERTY IS ESCAPED 
PROPERTY. 
The County imposed an escaped property assessment on Action's rental equipment 
property, which was subject to rental contracts on January 1 for each year, located in three 
stores within the County. Exhibit R-l, 2, 3. 
In the audit documents, Action's rental property is identified as code 260. Prior to the 
audit, Action reported property with a total taxable value of $10,051 in 1994 for the store 
located at 6602 South State Street. Action did not report any rental equipment on its personal 
property affidavit. The audit revealed that Action omitted or failed to report $137,757 of 
property, which was subject to rent to own contracts in 1994, rented from the State Street 
location. Action omitted $137,390 in 1993; $137,920 in 1992; and, $138,980 in 1991. It 
only reported between $9,988 and $12,033 in taxable personal property for the years at issue. 
Exhibit R-l. 
Similarly in 1994, Action omitted $178,823 in taxable value attributable to rental 
equipment located at its West Valley location. Exhibit R-2. Action omitted $178,200 in 
taxable value in 1993; $178,800 in 1992; $180,240 in 1991; and, $183,440 in 1990 at the 
West Valley location. For those years it only reported between $3,700 and $6,450 in taxable 
value. Exhibit R-2. 
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Action omitted $168,373 in taxable value in 1993 at its 250 West 2100 South location. 
It omitted $168,600 of taxable value in 1992; $169,900 in 1991; $172,900 in 1990; and, 
$170,650 in 1989. For those years it only reported between $15,333 and $27,900 in taxable 
value. Exhibit R-3. 
Action did not report the property which was subject to rental contracts because it 
believed that the property was tax exempt inventory.1 Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1114 (1996 
& Supp. 1998). ("Tangible personal property present in Utah on the assessment date, at 
noon, held for sale in the ordinary course of business or for shipping to a final out-of-state 
destination within 12 months and which constitutes the inventory of any retailer, wholesaler, 
distributor, processor, warehouseman, manufacturer, producer, gatherer, transporter, storage 
provider, farmer, or livestock raiser, is exempt from property taxation.") 
The Commission ruled that Action's rental property, i.e. property subject to rent-to-
own contracts as of January 1 of the years on appeal, is not inventory and therefore is 
taxable. R. at 9-10. Action did not appeal the Commission's decision denying the 
exemption. Nonetheless, it contends it is entitled to the exemption because of a good faith 
belief that its property is exempt. 
As applied to these proceedings: 
1Mr. Thorpe: So, because you deemed your property to be inventory and non-
taxable, you didn't add it to your return? 
Mr. Jones: That's correct. R. at 906. 
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"Escaped property" means "any property, whether personal, land, or any 
improvements to the property, subject to taxation and is: 
* * * 
(ii). . . omitted from the tax rolls because of the failure of the 
taxpayer to comply with the reporting requirements of this 
chapter." 
See Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(8)(a) (1996 & Supp. 1998). 
Escaped property may be assessed at any time as far back as five years prior to the 
time of discovery. Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-309 (1996). Action was required to set forth all 
the "personal property assessable by the assessor which is owned, possessed, managed, or 
under the control of the person at 12 o'clock noon on January 1." Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-
306(1). Action was required to include all of its property. Utah Code Ann. §59-2-306(2). 
It is apparent from the audits that Action did not report its rental equipment (code 260) 
on its personal property affidavits for any of the years subject to escaped assessment. 
Exhibits R-1, 2, 3; R. at 936. The Assessor's office examined Action's personal property 
affidavits and business records to verify that the rental equipment had not been reported. R. 
at 937. Action confirmed that it did not report the rental property which was subject to rent-
to-own contracts. R. at 906. Therefore, under the definition of escaped property, as applied 
to the foregoing facts, the Commission properly held that Action's rental property had 
escaped assessment because Action omitted the rental property from its affidavits when it 
was required to report all of its property. 
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Action did not appeal that part of the Commission's decision denying the exemption, 
but maintains that it was justified in not reporting the property for a variety of reasons, 
including a good faith belief that the property was exempt. Appellant's Brief at 24. Tax 
exemptions are only permitted if allowed under the constitution as implemented by statute. 
Utah Code Ann. §59-2-309 (1996) does not recognize an exemption from an escaped 
property assessment based on a good faith belief that one is entitled to an exemption. Good 
faith has been recognized for avoidance of the ten percent negligence penalty for failing to 
collect and remit taxes on sales, wherein the taxpayer can escape the penalty if non payment 
is based on a good faith interpretation of an arguable point of law. See Hales Sand & 
Gravel. Inc. v. Audit Div.. 842 P.2d 887, 895 (Utah 1992); Broadcast Int'l Inc. v. Utah State 
Tax Comm'n, 882 P.2d 691, 700-1 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). However, this has not been 
recognized as an excuse for non payment of escaped property assessments and should not be 
judicially adopted. Action's excuses should be rejected and the Commission's decision 
affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS OF FACT 
REGARDING THE COUNTY'S ESCAPED PROPERTY 
ASSESSMENT ARE ADEQUATE AND SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
A. Adequacy of the Findings of Fact. 
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Action challenges the adequacy of the Commission's finding of fact to support its 
conclusion that the property is escaped property. Appellant's Brief at 43. A review of the 
adequacy of the findings of fact is based on whether the agency's action is arbitrary or 
capricious. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv) (1997). This question is governed by the 
court's determination of whether it "is able to conduct meaningful review." Adams v. Bd. 
of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 821 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
"An administrative agency must make findings of fact and conclusions of law that are 
adequately detailed so as to permit meaningful appellate review." Adams at 4. However, 
an agency's failure to make adequate findings does not render its findings arbitrary and 
capricious, if the "evidence is 'clear, uncontroverted and capable of only one conclusion.'" 
Adams at 4-5 (citing Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) (quoting Kinkella v. 
Baugh. 660 P.2d 233,236 (Utah 1983))).2 Further, "[a] finding may be implied if it is clear 
from the record, and therefore apparent upon review, that the finding was actually made as 
part of the tribunal's decisions." Adams at 5. 
2Acton v. Deliran. was criticized in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787 n.6 (Utah 
1991) because Acton suggested that only a single exception exists to preclude reversal if 
the court fails to make findings on all material issues. There are several grounds 
justifying upholding the lower tribunal's decision, including the one recognized in Acton. 
The "clear and uncontroverted standard is "only one of several ways to avoid reversing a 
trial court that fails to make findings." Ramirez at 788 n.6. 
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The Commission's conclusions of law that Action's rental property is escaped 
property are based on adequate findings. The Commission made the following applicable 
findings: 
1) the property at issue is personal property owned by Petitioner; 
2) the personal property was subject to rent-to-own contracts on the 
respective lien dates; 
3) the property consists of furniture, appliances and electronic devices; 
4) the lessee had possession of these items on the lien date; 
5) Action did not include the property on its property tax affidavits; 
6) Action retained title to the property; 
7) the Assessor audited Action's business records and imposed an escaped 
property assessment; 
8) Action is in the business of leasing, with a possibility for eventual 
purchase, furniture, appliances and electronic devices; 
9) approximately 90% of Action's revenue is derived from rent-to-own 
contracts. 
The foregoing findings are adequate to support the Commission's conclusion and to 
provide for meaningful appellate review. The evidence is clear, uncontroverted and capable 
of only one conclusion. Action did not report on its personal property affidavit any of the 
property it rents pursuant to its rent-to-own contracts, and has not done so for the years 
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subject to the escaped property assessment. The findings also show that the property is 
owned by Action even though the property is subject to rental contracts. Action did not 
appeal the Commission's decision that the property is not exempt from taxation as inventory, 
thus the property is subject to taxation as required in Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(8)(a). 
Based on the foregoing, the Commission's decision is based on adequate findings. 
Even if the Commission's findings are inadequate, relief should not be granted 
because Action has not been substantially prejudiced. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4). 
"[T]he substantial prejudice language in section 63-46b-16(4) prevents an appellate court 
from granting relief if an agency error is harmless." Adams at 7 (citing Morton Int'L Inc. v. 
Utah State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 581, 584-585 (Utah 1991)). Error is harmless if it is 
"'sufficiently inconsequential that. . . there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected 
the outcome of the proceedings.'" Adams at 7 (quoting Morton Int'l at 584-85). Further, 
there is no substantial prejudice in failing to make adequate findings if the evidence is clear 
and uncontroverted. Adams at 7. If there were errors in making adequate findings, it was 
harmless and did not affect the outcome of the proceedings. 
In summary, the Commission's findings of fact regarding escaped property are 
adequate and have not substantially prejudiced Action. Even if the findings are not adequate, 
the evidence is clear and uncontroverted that Action did not report its property on its 
affidavits. The evidence leads to only one conclusion - the property is "escaped property" 
and therefore the Commission's decision should be affirmed. 
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Finally, Action requests that the decision be reversed and a refund ordered because 
of the inadequacy of the findings. Appellant's Brief at 43. This is not appropriate relief. 
"As a general rule, the appropriate relief for an agency's failure to make adequate findings 
is to vacate the order complained of and to order the agency to 'make more adequate findings 
in support of, and more fully articulate [the] reasons for, the determination . . . made.'" 
Adams at 8 (quoting Vali Convalescent and Care Inst, v. Div. of Health Care Financing. 797 
P.2d 438, 450 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
B. Substantial Evidence to Support the Findings of Fact. 
Action also contends that the findings of fact that rental property constitutes escaped 
property is not supported by substantial evidence. "[T]he party challenging the 
Commission's findings must marshal all of the evidence supporting the findings and show 
that despite the supporting facts, the findings are not supported by substantial evidence." 
First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. County Bd. of Equalization. 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990). 
"Substantial evidence" "is that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to 
convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion." Id. at 1165. 
Mr. Sterling Patrick, Manager of the Personal Property Auditing Division of the 
County Assessor's office, testified that Action's small rental equipment, identified by code 
260 in the audit, had not been reported by Action on its personal property affidavits for any 
of the years subject to the audit at any of its stores. Exhibits R-l, 2, 3; R. at 935-37, 940. 
The audit information was obtained from Action's business records and personal property 
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affidavits. R. at 937. Only personal property subject to rent-to-own contracts and referred 
to in Action's records as Balance on Rent (BOR), was assessed as escaped property. R. at 
939. Property listed as available for sale and not subject to rental contracts was treated as 
exempt inventory. R. at 938. Action confirmed that it did not report on its personal property 
affidavits the property subject to rent-to-own contracts. R. at 906. 
Therefore, the evidence is substantial to support the Commission's findings of fact 
that the property escaped assessment. Action omitted the property from its affidavit. No 
evidence in the record contradicts those findings. 
In conclusion, the Commission's findings of fact are adequate, are based on 
substantial evidence and the Commission's decision should be affirmed. 
POINT III 
THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS OF FACT 
REGARDING THE FIVE YEAR LIFE VALUATION 
SCHEDULE ARE ADEQUATE AND SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, 
A. Adequacy of the Findings of Fact. 
Action challenges the adequacy of the Commission's findings of fact to support its 
conclusion that the property should be depreciated using the Commission's five year class 
life. R. at 9. The Commission's findings are adequate, and hence are not arbitrary or 
capricious, because the court can "conduct meaningful review" of the findings and of the 
conclusions of law. Adams, 821 P.2d at 4. 
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The Commission's decision to use the five-year class life is based on the following 
applicable findings: 
1) The property at issue is personal property; 
2) The property is owned by Action but is subject to rent-to-own 
contracts; 
3) The property is primarily furniture, appliances and electronic devices; 
4) The County's assessments are based on Action's cost for the property 
multiplied by the percent good tables established by the Commission 
in its Recommended Schedule for Personal Property Valuation; 
5) The percent good is based on a five year class life. 
6) Action's customers intend to keep the items subject to rent to 
own contracts and use them after they acquired title; 
7) Action generally disposes of the items within three years of 
acquiring them either through rent to own contracts, out-right 
sale or write off. 
The Commission must make'" findings of fact on all necessary ultimate issues under 
the governing statutory standards.'" Adams at 5 (quoting Milne Truck Lines. Inc. v. Pub. 
Serv. Comm'n. 720 P.2d 1373, 1378 (Utah 1986)). The ultimate issue is the fair market 
value of the property subject to rental contracts. To arrive at a determination of that issue the 
Commission had to determine whether to uphold the County's use of Action's actual costs 
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for the property and whether the property should be depreciated using the Commission's 
percent good schedules, which measure the economic life of the property over five years, or 
as urged by Action, whether the property should be depreciated using 18-24 month straight-
line depreciation. 
The Commission's findings of fact address all of the "necessary ultimate issues." The 
Commission found that the County's assessments were based on Action's cost for the 
property multiplied by the Commission's percent good schedules using a five year class life. 
R. at 6. The Commission's finding, that the County's assessment was based on the five year 
class life and the Commission's ultimate adoption of this finding in its conclusions of law 
and decision, is based on subsidiary findings that Action disposed of the property within 
three years and that the customers continued to use the property after they acquired it. R. at 
7. 
These subsidiary findings, as well as findings which may be implied because they are 
clear from the record, reveal that the Commission found that the five year class life reflected 
the most accurate measure of depreciation for the property. "A finding may be implied if it 
is clear from the record, and therefore apparent upon review, that the finding was actually 
made as part of the tribunal's decision." Adams at 5. 
This finding may be implied because the record reflects that the 18-24 month straight-
line depreciation was not a measure of value but an IRS income tax depreciation method, 
used to measure income and expenses to reflect book value, which is not a reflection of fair 
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market value. R. at 972. The five year class life accounts for greater wear and tear 
recognized for rental property, the very reason Action believes it is entitled to a two year 
depreciation schedule. R. at 971-2. Further, Action's customers contradicted its claims that 
the property was frequently junked because the customers intended to keep the property and 
maintained it in good condition. R. at 722, 796. Action's witnesses admitted that the 18-24 
month depreciation represented the useful life of the property to the seller, not to the 
customer. R. at 871-2, 911. 
Based on the foregoing, the Commission's findings of fact, including the subsidiary 
findings and the findings which may be implied as reflected in the record, are sufficient to 
provide adequate appellate review. 
B. Substantial Evidence to Support the Findings of Fact. 
Action contends that the Commission's findings of fact regarding the five year 
depreciation schedule are not supported by substantial evidence. "[T]he party challenging 
the Commission's findings must marshal all of the evidence supporting the findings and 
show that despite the supporting facts, the findings are not supported by substantial 
evidence." First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 799 P.2d at 1165. "Substantial evidence" "is that 
quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to 
support a conclusion." Id. 
Substantial evidence exists in the record to support the findings of fact. Mr. Denny 
Lytle, the Assistant Director of the Commission's Property Tax Division (Division), testified 
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that there is a difference between the IRS' class life and the IRS' depreciation for income tax 
purposes. Transcript at 153-4, Addendum A. The IRS class life represents the economic life 
of the equipment, which is its useful productive life to the person using the equipment. 
Transcript at 154, Addendum A. He testified that the Division relies on the IRS class life as 
a basis for the Commission's schedules for percent good or depreciation. Exhibit R-5; 
Transcript at 154, Addendum A. 
Mr. Sterling Patrick, Manager of the Personal Property Auditing Division of the 
Assessor's office, testified that the County used the recognized cost approach in appraising 
Action's property when it used the Commission's schedules. R. at 955-56. Also the County 
used Action's actual or wholesale cost. R. at 961. He also disputed that using Action's 
recommended 18 to 24 month depreciation represented the true useful economic life of the 
property. R. at 955. He testified that the Commission's class three schedule (5 year class 
life) includes property subject to severe wear and tear, such as the subject rental property, 
and therefore the schedule properly accounts for greater than normal depreciation. R. at 960. 
Further, nearly 65% of the rent-to-own customers purchase the property. R. at 967. 
Action's customers stated they maintain the property in good condition and treat it as if it 
was their own. R. at 722, 796. Mr. Patrick believed that the customers' testimony was 
inconsistent with Action's claims of severe wear and tear which Action used to justify the 
18-24 month depreciation. Commissioner Oveson noted the inconsistency as well. R. at 
967. 
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Allen Tippetts, the Director of the Personal Property Division of the Assessor's office, 
testified that Class 3 (five year class life) adequately accounts for depreciation for rental 
equipment. R. at 970. The typical class life for refrigerators or washers and dryers owned 
by businesses is 9 to 10 years. R. at 971. Therefore, the five year class life accounts for the 
greater wear and tear recognized for small rental property. R. at 971-2; Exhibit R-5. 
Mr. Tippetts also noted the distinction between depreciation for income tax purposes 
and depreciation for valuation purposes. Depreciation applied in appraisals is a loss in value 
due to all reasons. Accounting depreciation matches costs against revenue. The 
Commission's schedules employ a percent good methodology to arrive at fair market value; 
whereas depreciation for accounting purposes as used by Action is used to establish book 
value, which does not equal fair market value. R. at 972. 
Action's witnesses and documentary evidence support the Commission's findings as 
well. Mr. Kent Thomas stated that Action's suggested 18 month straight line depreciation 
for rental property is based on the average length of the contract and the economic value to 
the seller, i.e. the time period it has value to be sold or rented to a customer. R. at 871. Mr. 
Thomas' testimony regarding the actual or useful life of the property did not consider the 
value of the useful life to the buyer. R. at 871-2. He did not know the definition of 
depreciation for appraisal purposes and admitted that the straight line depreciation of 18-24 
months is for accounting or IRS income tax purposes. R. at 872. Mr. Thomas admitted he 
was not an appraiser and had taken no classes on appraising personal property. R. at 873. 
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Further, Mr. Thomas had previously submitted his study on depreciation, which he believed 
justified the 18-24 month depreciation used by the rent-to-own industry, to the Division, but 
Mr. Lytle stated that the Division found the evidence to be "inconclusive". R. at 929. 
Mr. Dan Jones, the former owner of Action, testified that the average useful life of the 
property to the seller is 18-24 months but he assumed that the property has greater than 18-24 
months useful life to the purchaser. R. at 911. 
Action also claimed that the property is often junked and therefore the 18-24 month 
depreciation should be adopted. But Action's documentary evidence contradicts that 
assertion. Mr. Thomas' URDA study shows that only 0.05% of the property was junked. 
Exhibit P-6. Action's Inventory Tracking Report for March and April 1994 shows only 
1.85% was junked. Exhibit P-4. 
Further, Action did not present an appraisal of the property. Mr. Jerry Erkelen's 
testimony and "appraisal" was offered solely for demonstrative purposes and not as a 
valuation of the property. R. at 811. His "appraisal" was prepared over two years after the 
lien date and was not directly tied to any of the specific property subject to appeal. R. at 811. 
("They (sic) document which we will be entering as an Exhibit is merely prepared for 
demonstrative purposes, not to the value of the particular property which is at issue in this 
case.") 
Based on the foregoing evidence in the record, there is substantial evidence to support 
the Commission's findings of fact that justified the County's use of the Commission's 
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Recommended Schedules for Personal Property Valuation (five year class life) to depreciate 
the cost of the rental property in order to arrive at fair market value. 
In conclusion, the Commission findings of fact are adequate and based on substantial 
evidence. The Commission's decision should be affirmed. 
POINT IV 
ACTION HAS FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN OF 
PROOF TO OVERTURN THE COUNTY'S VALUATION. 
The County's audit was the basis for the valuation of the escaped property. By using 
Action's actual costs (wholesale) for the property subject to rental contracts and applying the 
Commission's percent good tables for a five year class life, the Board arrived at the fair 
market value for the subject property for each year at issue. Exhibits R-l, 2, 3; R. at 955-56, 
960-61. Although Action disputed the use of the five year class life as the basis for 
depreciation, it did not submit an appraisal of the subject property and therefore provided no 
evidence of the fair market value of the subject property. 
"In challenging the Board's valuation, Petitioner has a significant burden of proof that 
he must meet." Nelson v. County Bd. of Equalization. 943 P.2d 1354, 1356 (Utah 1997). 
Not only must the Petitioner show that the Commission's findings lack support, the Petitioner 
"must provide an adequate basis for adopting a lower assessment." Id at 1356. 
Action offered Mr. Erkelen's "appraisal" only for demonstrative purposes and not for 
purposes of valuation. R. at 811. Mr. Thomas admitted he was not an appraiser and had no 
20 
training as an appraiser. R. at 873. He did not submit an appraisal of the subject property. 
In summary, Action has failed to meet its burden of proof because it hasn't shown that 
the Commission's findings lack support, and it did not submit an appraisal to provide an 
adequate basis for adopting a lower assessment. The Commission's decision should be 
affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the County respectfully requests that the court affirm the 
Commission's decision. 
Respectfully submitted this /j- day of October, 1998. 
OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL 
MARY ELLEN SLOAN 
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ADDENDUM 
A 
Multi-Page™ 
Page 150 
Mr. Thorpe: No further questions, 
Ms. Sloan: No further questions. 
Judge Phan: All right. Chairman Oveson, do you 
have any questions? 
Chairman Oveson: No, I shot my wad with the CPA. 
Mr. Thorpe: And he's not a CPA. 
Judge Phan: All right. Then you may have a 
seat, Mr. Jones. 
Mr. Thorpe: Mr. Jones is my final witness. 
Judge Phan: All right. Then we'll go on to your 
presentation, Ms. Sloan. 
Ms. Sloan: We call on Mr. Denny Liddle at this 
time. 
Judge Phan: Okay. Is he right outside? Okay. 
All right. Mr. Liddle, will you raise your right 
hand? Do you solemnly affirm under penalty of perjury 
the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the 
whole truth, and nothing but the truth? 
Mr. Liddle: Yes. 
Judge Phan: Okay, have a seat. 
Judge Phan: Ms. Sloan if you would like to sit, 
you can do that, or stand, either way. 
Ms. Sloan: Mr. Liddle, could you please state 
your name for the record and your place of employment. 
Mr. Liddle: Denny Liddle, Utah State Tax i 
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Commission, Property Tax Division. 
Ms. Sloan: And what do you do in your 
occupation? 
Mr. Liddle: Assistant Director over the Property 
Tax Division. 
Ms. Sloan: Are you familiar with personal 
property taxation and Rent-to-Own contracts? 
Mr. Liddle: Yes, to some degree. 
Ms. Sloan: Are you familiar with the Division's 
policy regarding the taxation of property which is 
subject to Rent-to-Own contracts? 
Mr. Liddle: Yes. 
Ms. Sloan: And what is Division's policy? 
Mr. Liddle: To follow the Administrative Rule. 
Ms. Sloan: And-what is the Administrative Rule? 
Mr. Liddle: Currently, it is that for property 
that is out on rent January 1st, it is taxable for 
anything that is sitting on the floor that can be 
either sold or rented, that that is exempt. 
Ms. Sloan: And, how what is your experience 
and how are the assessors expected to administer that 
Rule? 
Mr. Liddle: By affidavit from declaration of the 
tax payer. Personal property is a self-assessing 
affidavit throughout most of the State, so the tax 
DEPOMAX REPORTING, LLC (801) 328-1188 
paye 
then 
r is 
Ms. 
. if 
expecte 
Sloan: 
Multi-Page™ 
Page 152 
d to complete that process. 
So, pursuant to Tax Commission Rule, 
it is property held for rent or (inaudible) 
it is taxable, even if it is rented? Is that correct? 
are 
for 
rent 
Mr. Liddle: 
actually two 
Rent 
-to-
Ms. 
-to-Own 
rent. 
Sloan: 
Please restate that question. There 
parts to that one part specifically 1 
and one part that deals more with 
Well, we're dealing with Rent-to-Own 
primarily. If you could again state what the policy 
is or the ruling 
1st, 
Mr. 
on 
Liddle: 
a Rent-t 
(inaudible). 
If it's out on rent as of January 
o-Own contract, it's taxable. If it 
is sitting on the floor and not out, it's exempt. 
Ms. 
a TC595 
the 
1 this 
Mr. 
Ms. 
Mr. 
Ms. 
Mr. 
Ms. 
Mr. 
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form? 
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Liddle: 
Sloan: 
Liddle: 
Sloan: 
Liddle: 
TC595 came f 
pos ition. 
Are you familiar with what is called 
Yes: 
And how are those used? 
They are not. 
They are not used currently? 
That's correct. 
And what was their use initially? 
It was a method I'm not sure where 
rom it was in place when I came to 
I know that it was little used by tax ] 
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payers or counties. The what TC595 tried to do, 
though, was also tax a portion of the property that 
sat on the Rent-to-Own company's floor, to determine 
what portion of that would be rented and what portion 
would be sold outright. And to also tax that 
inventory, even though it wasn't out on a Rent-to-Own 
contract. That's what the TC595 attempted to do. 
Ms. Sloan: Why is it not used? 
Mr. Liddle: It was done away with partly to 
increase consistency of administration within the 
counties. It wasn't being used, we had not real 
method to enforce it, and after examining statute and 
rule, we decided that probably the most consistent way 
to administer the program would be to give the 
taxpayer the benefit -of the doubt and assume that all 
that property that was sitting on the showroom floor 
would be sold outright. Because we had no real way of 
knowing which of that would be rented and which would 
be sold. 
Ms. Sloan: And so that would be exempt if it was 
sitting to be sold outright? Is that correct? 
Mr. Liddle: Correct. 
Ms. Sloan: Is there a difference between the IRS 
class life and the IRS depreciation for income tax 
purposes? 
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Mr. Liddle: Yes • 
Ms. Sloan: What is the difference? 
Mr. Liddle: For income tax purposes, it is my 
understanding, is that it accelerated depreciation to 
a level allowed by the IRS. The class life or what we 
consider is economic life to be the useful productive 
life of that equipment. 
Ms. Sloan: And that would be to the person that 
was using it. 
Mr. Liddle: Correct. 
Ms. Sloan: And you gave the or does the Property 
Tax Division (inaudible) Commission's schedule 
regarding the classification of property recognized by 
IRS (inaudible)? 
Mr. Liddle: We do to the degree possible? We 
have a simplified mass appraisal system. We do not 
where we combine various class-lifes into one 
schedule. We would have hundreds of schedules if we 
tried to use all of the IRS class lifes. But they 
combined to a just simplified for the taxpayer and for 
administrative purposes as much" as possible, while 
still maintaining the integrity of the valuation 
system. So they don't match exactly, but we do rely 
on the IRS class lifes. 
Ms. Sloan: Had you ever stated that the that 
DEPOMAX REPORTING, LLC (801) 328-1188 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Multi-Page™ 
Page isj 
in your view the Commission would change the class 
life if the IRS did? 
Mr. Liddle: My recollection of that is that that 
any time that the IRS changes a class life, we give 
that considerable weight in making any changes to our 
schedules. It would be the overriding factor, but we 
would give it weight. Yes. 
Ms. Sloan: So, just the fact that they made 
changes it would not per se result in an action 
where you would change or the Commission would change 
class life? 
Mr. Liddle: No. Because, as I explained before, 
there are various class lifes that fit within each of 
our schedules. We have a simplified system over what 
they have. 
Ms. Sloan: If the IRS changed the MACRS or ACRS, 
I guess (inaudible) class life, would that affect the 
situation? 
Mr. Liddle: I'm not even really fully aware of 
MACRS and ACRS. We do not rely on that for anything 
that we do in the schedule building. We consider that 
for income tax purposes and has no real reference to 
the valuation procedure. 
Ms. Sloan: Thank you. 
Judge Phan: Mr. Thorpe? 
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